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Abstract
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (hereafter SPACs) well known as blind pool or
blank check companies are defined, in a simple way, as alternative way to access the
public markets. Since SPACs are becoming an increasingly popular alternative
investment vehicle as they are a meritorious entity to substitute the presence of private
equity in some segments of the market (Reimer 2007), this study is dedicated to analyze
the returns for investors and clarify the impact that the market prices have in the
decision of the investors. This topic assumes a particular importance for investors,
managers, shareholders, and founders to understand how the decision-making process
works in this kind of “blind pool” investments. Similar study (Jenkinson and Sousa,
2011) has been done for the period between 2003 and 2006 and concluded that investor
should listen to the market while approving/rejecting proposed deals. Our sample
expands the time frame for the period between 2007 and 2013, in order to identify if the
changes occurred, after 2007, in the SPACs structure changed the way the investors take
their decisions and started taking into account the information imbedded in market
prices  at  the  decision  date.  Our  study  clearly  demonstrates  that  neither  the  alert  of
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) nor the changes in the SPACs structure change the
behavior of investors and so investors are still not listening to the market and approving
value destroying deals.
Key-words: SPACs, blind pools, blank checks, IPO, Private Equity
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11. Introduction
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are companies that go public with the
sole purpose to acquire or merge with a private firm by using the money that was
previously raised through an Initial Public Offering (IPO).  This alternative route to the
public markets is an undeveloped topic in the financial literature, as such only few
studies were published and analyzed in detail its relation with the market prices.
Over the years the investment in SPACs has gained importance. While in 2003,
only one SPAC was issued in the IPO markets,  in 2007 sixty-six SPACs were part  of
IPO market rising $12 billion and constituting 24% of the US IPO market. In 2008, the
number  of  SPACs  started  to  fall  (17  SPACs),  maybe  due  to  the  worldwide  crisis.
However, in 2011, moment from which the US economy begun to pick up, the number
of SPACs increased, taking part of 12% of the US IPO market. In 2015, 20 SPACs were
issued raising around $4 billion.
Traditional IPO differs from SPACs because at the time of the SPAC, investors
have no knowledge about the company that they are investing in, and so it is done
taking into account the ability of the founders (blind pools). In another way, private
equity  funds  can  also  differ  from SPACs in  different  ways,  namely  the  decision  to  be
acquired by SPAC can bring cash infusion, liquidity and publicly traded shares without
the loose of the control through the use of reverse merge.
SPACs have some particularities in its investment, being one of them the limited
life time that should be attended to take a decision (merger or liquidation). Since there is
a timeline to respect, sometimes the decision taken by investors (which are acquiring
companies by trusting in the ability of the founders and have no protection due to the
nature of the investment) are not in accordance with the returns that it can provide and
as such it is most likely that significant losses are incurred.
As there are only few studies on this topic and as SPACs only recently become a
very popular way to access the public markets, this study is relevant for founders,
shareholders, management team and investors, to understand how the decision-making
process in the SPACs work, the returns that can be obtained and how investors and
founders react to the fluctuations of the share market prices between the announcement
and decision date. Additionally, it is also important to stress that, around the years 2008
2and 2009, some changes occurred in the structure of SPACs. Hence, this study is also
pertinent to understand if the changes occurred in the structure of the SPACs conducted
to different decision-making process for investors, considering the fact that the previous
study conducted by Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) – “Why SPAC Investors Should Listen
to the Market” – had already warned that investors should consider the market prices at
the decision date.
Further to the above, this study main intent is to examine the results
comprehended between the years of 2007 and 2013 of the US market, taking into
account mainly the approach used by Jenkinson and Sousa (2011). We will compare the
results with the previous released studies, which will allow us to analyze the differences
in the returns of complete and incomplete SPACs with the previous period studied by
these authors (2003-2006).
This study will proceed with a literature review in the next chapter which
contains a detailed definition of SPACs, a general overview of the same and also some
main changes occurred recently in the SPACs structure. Afterwards, in chapter 3, the
methodology is explained while in chapter 4 the results are presented considering the
implications  (if  any)  of  the  change  in  SPACs  structure  in  the  judgments  taken  by
investors and also the comparison of the results obtained in both of the periods that were
analyzed (2003-2006 vs. 2007-2013). In chapter 5, one of the most famous acquisitions
occurred in the SPACs – the Aldabra II acquisition of Boise, Inc. – is analyzed in order
to provide a detailed view of the methodology applied in each of the company included
in our study. Chapter 6 concludes.
32. Literature Review
The literature is divided into three parts. In the first part, a definition of the topic and a
general  overview  will  be  described  covering  some  of  the  main  rules  of  this  type  of
investments as well as the differences of this type of investment with the traditional IPO
and the private equity funds. The second part point out the recent changes verified in the
SPACs  structures.  Finally,  the  third  and  last  part  of  this  section  contains  some  main
theories and similar studies.
2.1. Definition and General overview of SPACs
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs)1 are  companies  that  go  public  with
the sole purpose to acquire or merge with a private firm by using the money that was
previously raised through the IPO (consisting in units composed by shares and normally
by “out-the-money” warrants). In a simple way, SPACs can be defined as an alternative
way to access the public markets that provide a potentially attractive way of raising
external equity financing. It appears to be a viable alternative to the traditional IPO from
the perspective of an acquired company because they bring in cash infusion, share
liquidity and vested-in underwriters (Sjostrom, 2008). Traditional IPO differs from
SPACs, since it’s a “blind pool” investment, i.e. investors at the time of the investment
have no knowledge about the company which means that the investment is done taking
into account the ability of the founders. In this sense, blind pools and blank check
companies are terms often used to define SPACs, by means of there are no assets or
revenues at the moment (no operational business) of the entry in the public market, and
the only intent is to acquire an operational business. There is not a specific data,
characteristics or indexes that are common in each SPAC; however they are sometimes
formed to pursue an acquisition in a particular industry or sector, or even in a particular
region.
Notwithstanding the above, SPACs can be also described as a type of IPO that
have a limited life, normally due 24 months, while “traditional” IPOs don´t have a
1 SPACs are normally formed by a small group of experienced managers and sponsors that rely mainly on
their reputation.
4defined time frame in the markets, SPAC has a determinate period to announce an
acquisition  (18  months)  and  then  decide  to  merge  or  acquire  a  company (24  months).
SPACs life start at the first day of the IPO and if within two years the founders of the
SPAC do not find a potential target, the SPAC is liquidated. To avoid liquidation, 80%
of the net assets should be spent in a chosen business combination. Another specific
characteristic of SPACs are that the proceeds that were raised through the IPO are
placed in escrow, typically between 85% and 100%, however the “new generation of
SPACs" are placing between 95 and 100% (Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2013), which
cannot be used by the founders until the deal with the potential target is closed. Thus, if
in the referred period the founders were not able to found a company to acquire/merge,
the proceeds that were previously placed in the escrow are returned to the holders of
IPO shares (Savitz, 2005). For the period of time that the proceeds are placed in the
trust, the amounts are invested in short-term government securities where the trust can
earn the interest at Treasury bill rate.  In another way, the remaining amount that is not
placed in trust is used for underwriter fees, expenses and working capital. Besides the
complete SPACs (SPACs that make an acquisition) and liquidated SPACs (SPACs that
announce an acquisition but at the decision date don´t acquire or merge with a
company) the incomplete SPACs are also important to understand. Incomplete SPACs
are those that have not announced an acquisition within 18 months and so the SPAC
ceases.  Appendix  1  demonstrates  SPACs  timeline.  As  a  result,  during  the  life  of  the
SPAC, potential targets are identified by the management team, afterwards in order to
proceed with the business plan 80% of the votes of its shareholders should be obtained,
otherwise the SPAC is liquidated. However, it is important to note that this last
requirement has changed recently, as we will describe in the next section.
With this perspective, sometimes SPACs are presented to investors as an
alternative to private equity funds. Well, private equity funds are quite different from
SPACs. The biggest difference is while SPACs (normally take private companies
public) issue new equity to fund their acquisitions, private equity funds (take either
public or private company private) raise new fund to raise new equity capital.  In
another way, private equity executives require significant proportion of management
fees, usually 20% of the profits of the fund. In SPACs, management fees are minimum
but founders can profit even if the fund incur in losses (i.e. in the value destroying
5deals), because they are allocated 20% of the equity of the merged/acquired company.
Although a higher payout can be earned if the SPAC is value creator deal instead of
value destroyer deal, the founder payoff is dependent on the capital value of the deal
and so there is an incentive for founders to complete the SPAC, even if value destroyer
deal.
Many investors prefer to invest in SPACs then in private equity funds, due to the
fact that  investors do not want to lose their  voting control over the companies that are
chosen by the management team to invest in. Also, the SPAC involves limited downside
because a significant portion of the funds raised in the IPO are placed in escrow
(Michael A. Pittenger and Cara M. Grisin,  2007).  In a simple way, sometimes SPACs
are chosen by investors that need investment alternatives but do not want to lose the
control of their investments and don´t want to expend a lot of money (private equity, as
refereed previously, can be relatively expensive).
Despite the existence of these advantages in SPACs, when comparing to the
traditional IPOs and private equity funds, there are some risks faced by its management
team.  SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) regulation, arbitrage opportunities,
liquidation and behavioral analysis are some of the risks identified by Stowell (2009).
Taking into account this author perspective, SEC regulation can be seen as a risk due to
the fact that SPACs are not subject to the “usual” SEC inspection process to access the
public markets like the traditional IPOs. As such, some authors believe that due to the
specific type of regulation of SEC provided to the SPACs, the rules can be abused. Also
there are some authors that states that SEC regulations provided to SPACs are sufficient
to protect the shareholders considering the corporate governance mechanisms that are
placed in the SPACs.
Liquidation is also described as a risk since “a proposed transaction must not be
rejected by more than 20% of the shareholder base, investors can easily vote to liquidate
the  trust  rather  than  risk  an  acquisition”.  Also  the  short-term  defined  to  make  an
announcement or acquisition/merger is seen risker for investors to make a decision, as
any economic event that may occur during the defined period can conduct to
liquidation of the SPAC.
62.2. Relevant changes on the SPACs structure
After 2007 the SPACs structure has suffered some changes that are important to notice,
such  as  in  the  SPACs  securities  and  in  their  terms.  As  we  know,  SPACs  go  public
through  an  IPO  which  consist,  normally,  in  units  of  one  share  and  one  warrant.  A
warrant can be exercisable for a share of common stock. Moreover, it is likely to verify
a  potential  dilution  for  shareholders  of  the  combined  company,  also  the  terms  of  the
warrant allows the warrant to be callable by the company only if the trading price of the
stock appreciates meaningfully. In this way, the warrants that were only exercisable for
one  share  of  common  stock  are  now  exercisable  also  for  one-half  or  one-third  of  the
common stock. Some SPACs have also decided to offer just common stock in their
IPOs.
The  time  frame  of  the  SPAC  has  also  suffered  some  changes.  As  we  have
noticed in the Appendix 1 there is a defined announcement period in which the SPAC
should announce the target company within 18 months, but recently this have changed
due to the short  period given to decide to approve the deal after the announcement (6
months).  Hence, some SPACs have applied only a flat  time-frame term, usually of 24
months.
In  the  past  for  a  business  combination  to  proceed,  it  was  needed  the  majority
shareholders approval (80% of the votes in favor) and not more than 20% of the public
shareholders could vote against the deal and exercise their redemption right. After 2007,
the voting right policy changed, as in more recent SPACs it is not required the public
shareholders to vote against the deal to redeem the shares. Thus, shareholders can
redeem their shares even the votes are in favor of the respective combination. However,
we still have some SPACs in the markets that require the votes against of the business
combination to allow shareholders to redeem the shares.
In case a shareholder wants to redeem his shares by receiving a pro rata portion
of the trust account at the time of the business combination, the trust account funds are
used  to  proceed  with  the  deal  and  then  they  are  used  to  pay  the  shareholders  that  had
chosen to redeem their shares.
It is important to note that the business combination agreement requires an
amount of cash after the shares redemption. Moreover, the cash amount left in the trust
7account after the shares redemption should not be lower than the amount fixed in the
SPAC agreement to approve the deal. Otherwise, the SPAC cannot be completed.
In another way, in the past, the management team could only vote its founder
shares and any public shares acquired by it after the IPO in favor of the proposed deal.
After 2007, the management team can also vote during or after the IPO in favor of the
proposed deal.
2.3. Relevant Studies
SPAC  is  a  recent  topic  that  grown  popularity  after  the  year  of  2003,  when  only  one
SPAC generated $24 million in the US market and in 2008 SPACs was part of one third
of  the  US  IPO  market  (in  both  of  the  viewpoints:  number  of  offerings  and  money
raised). The Figure 1 exhibits the number of SPACs issued over the period 2003 and
2015 compared with the IPOs that were issued in the US markets, also the SPAC
average proceeds generated over the period is shown.
Figure 1 – SPACs evolution over the period 2003-2015
8The Figure 1, also presents the increasing SPAC average proceeds that are
placed in the public markets, reaching $195 million in 2015 by issuing 20 SPACs over
190  IPOs  of  the  US  markets.   It  is  important  to  note  that  SPACs  are  normally  only
issued in the following US Markets: OTCBB, NASDAQ, AMEX and NYSE.
Due to the recent popularity, only few studies related to this topic were
published, nevertheless given the fast increase of this “financial innovation” there are
some very important studies that should be highlighted.
As previously mentioned, there are some main characteristics that should be
taken into account when considering SPACs, as so, Jog and Sun (2007) introduced the
first paper that explains the main characteristics of SPACs and examines the returns
obtained by its investors and founders. These authors has completed this study by
concluding that “it looks like that investors have wrote a blank check to investors”, this
deduction is taken by the examination that was held using a sample of 62 SPACs
between 2003-2006 were investors report a negative annual return of 3% in a subsample
of  42  SPACs.  Thus  they  have  tested  the  SPACs  equity  in  the  long  term  and  the
performance of the securities at the day of issuance. In addition to the negative 3%
annual  return  obtained  in  a  subsample  of  42  SPACs  for  the  SPAC  investors  also  a
1,900% of annualized returns were reported for SPAC founders as well as the
underpricing on the day of the IPO. The result for the underpricing was 0.38%, which is
highly expected to relate with expectations of SPACs investors that want to maintain the
offering price at the first trading day.  Related to the underpricing Boyer and Baigent
(2008) analyzed a sample of 87 SPACs issued between 2003 and 2006 and concluded
that a traditional IPO has higher underpricing at the first day when compared to SPACs.
According to them, also a very positive relationship among the price and the size of the
offerings at the first day is found.
In a more specific study Berger (2008) introduces three different cases studies of
SPACs to allow a better understanding of the advantages that can be provided in the
SPACs transactions and explains how SPACs can be used in a strategic way as an
alternative way to access the public markets. Berger (2008) states that companies with
specific requirements use SPACs as a way to access the public markets, otherwise the
traditional IPOs have remained as a favorite route to companies.
9Lewellen (2009) show three important factors that need to be considered while
trading SPACs: 1) “stock prices should always exceed the value of the pro-rata share of
the trust, discounted from the SPAC expiration date”, 2) “if an acquisition is approved,
the stock price should be greater than pro-rata share of the trust” (i.e. shares values for
investors should reflect their decision to keep the SPAC which should be reflected in its
price), 3) “the acquisitions that have been completed should have positive excess returns
as long as there is positive market beta, because after an acquisition there is a merely
another company that have shares, no unique features are created in the SPAC stocks”.
This third rule should be highlighted, because after the moment that a SPAC is complete
(post-acquisition) a company is performing in the market that should account the market
risk premium (in opposite of the pre-acquisition moment where the investment were
riskless), however this rule is found in conflict with reality of the SPAC performance as
most of the acquisitions made have negative returns. Therefore, after computing the
predictability  of  returns  in  SPACs  it  was  found  that  there  is  a  positive  post
announcement return and a negative post transaction return.
This finding is also confirmed by Jenkinson and Sousa (2011). More precisely
these authors have examined the specific relationship of market prices and investors’
return in a sample of 58 completed SPACs occurred between the years 2003 and 2008
(where the last two years already includes the 24 months given to the announcement
and close of the business combination). In the examined sample most of the completed
SPACs were value destroying instead of value creators.
Furthermore the study analyzed the management holdings before and after the
IPO, the size of the SPAC (number of common stock, warrants and offering price) and
the  amount  invested  in  the  trust  fund  after  the  IPO.  According  to  the  conclusions  of
their study, the authors created a “decision rule” that states that investors should accept
the deal if at the decision date the share price is higher than the trust value, otherwise
the SPAC should be liquidated, in order to avoid huge losses as incurred with some
investors that went against the market (lost around 39% of their investments within 6
months rising it to 79% over one year). Therefore, based on their study, investors that
went against the “basic” rule have incurred in huge losses, and as so the value of a
SPAC should be reflected in the stock prices.  Additionally, if the decision to acquire or
merge is taken near the deadline of the decision date (24 months) it would be better
10
because it will provide more certainty to investors about the investment value that the
business deal will create.
Dimitrova (2012) explores the cross-sectional variation in SPACs performance
and gives a significant importance to the shareholder value in the structure of the
SPACs. The paper examines SPACs between 2004 and 2010 in the US markets. The
results show that market reacts positively to the acquisition announcement but just for a
short-term  period  of  time   –  for  long-run  the  results  are  the  same  as  obtained  by  the
previous authors – SPAC acquires underperform the market. Along the investigation a
substantial cross-sectional variation at the short and long-term in the returns are evident,
this may be caused due to the continuous involvement of the SPAC founders as
shareholders and as board members. This result is consistent with Jenkinson and Sousa
(2011) that state that “sponsors may be wrongly incentivized to make substantial
purchases of the SPAC shares solely to ensure that they receive a favorable stockholder
vote on the proposed acquisition”.
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3. Sample and Methodology
The sample consists of SPACs issued in the US market within the period of 2007 and
20152. The SPACs were obtained mainly from Capital IQ database (116 SPACs) and in
some cases from Zephyr database (7 SPACs). From these databases it would be possible
to access to the prospectus of each company and extract the data such as management
holdings, investor returns, share prices, and others that seem important to analyze the
“judgment” taken by the investors at the decision date.
In order to extract the needed data from the Capital IQ database we have defined
the following criteria: 1) the registration effective date of the IPO should be between
January 1st, 2007 and December 31st, 20133;  2) IPOs should be issued in the OTTCB,
NASDAQ, NYSE or AMEX (US markets were the SPACs are issued, as referred
previously); 3) the IPOs should be considered as blank check or blind pool company.
Since in 2007 the Capital IQ database has not identified all the SPACs that were issued
in that year, we have used the Zephyr database to extract the missing SPACs. In order to
extract them through the Zephyr database, we have defined the following criteria: 1) the
deal should be issued on “IPOs & Capital Markets”; 2) on the business description we
have  tried  to  found the  following  key  words:  “Blank”,  “Check”,  “SPAC”;  3)  the  time
period should be “on and after 01/01/2007 and up to and including 31/12/2007
(rumored, completed-confirmed, completed-assumed, announced)”.4
Using the above criteria’s 123 SPACs were identified. However, four companies
were excluded due to data inconsistency5.
As in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) the sample was divided in those that approved
a deal (74) and those that were liquidated (49).
2 Although, the sample period in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) is from 2003 to 2008, it only includes
SPACs issued until 2006 in order to enable the examination of complete and incomplete SPACs, during
the 24 months after the IPO. As such, our study sample does not overlap the sample used by Jenkinson
and Sousa (2011).
3 The sample period ends in 2013 and not in 2015, because we are analyzing the results for complete and
incomplete SPACs, as so we are analyzing companies that have already made the decision to approve or
reject the deal, which takes normally up to two years.
4 The Zephyr database found 175 results for the defined criteria, from which we excluded SPACs that
were not issued in the US markets, those that were rumored and also those that were not completed.
5 For instance, some companies were described as SPACs and were in reality funds.
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3.1. “Good” and “Bad” SPACs split
In  the  research  of  the  authors  Jenkinson  and  Sousa  (2011),  SPACs  that  was  issued
between 2003 and 2006 were split according to the perspectives of “Good” and “Bad”
SPACs, besides the separation of Approve or Liquidated SPACs. “Good” SPACs are
those that at the decision date, investors approved the deal and at that date present a
share price higher than the trust value per share. In another way, “Bad” SPACs are those
that at the decision date, investors approved the deal with the share price below than the
trust value per share. As so, investors went against the market – value destroying deal.
Therefore, their study was conducted taking into account 23 “Bad” SPACs and
20 “Good” SPACs, being the main purpose of the collected sample6 the analysis of the
main characteristics of the SPACs issued in that period. After the previous separation of
the data, the performance of the share prices was also compared to the trust value
between the announcement and the decision dates.
Accordingly,  in  our  study,  with  the  intent  to  examine  if  there  are  also  more
approvals  of  “Bad”  SPACs  than  “Good”  SPACs,  even  with  the  alert  of  the  previous
study of Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) and the changes in the SPACs structure, and
compute the descriptive statistics, the sub-sample of SPACs that made an acquisition
was split in “Good” and “Bad” SPACs, according to the share price on the decision
date. As such in our sample of 123 companies, 55 SPACs were considered as “Bad”
SPAC and 19 were “Good” SPACs.
The last trust value is known taken into account the amount placed in the trust
account by the company according to the last prospectus available. Therefore, the last
trust value can be easily obtained by dividing the last amount placed in trust account
and the number of shares in the day of the IPO, which was known from the beginning
through the first prospectus of the company.
The share price at the decision date for each company will be obtained by using
the following computation:
6 Sample collected from Capital IQ database, namely, management holdings, number of units and offering
price of the SPAC, common stock and warrants in each unit, share prices, announcement date, decision
date, trust value and actual amount invested in the trust fund after the IPO.
13
ࡿࢎࢇ࢘ࢋ	࢖࢘࢏ࢉࢋ	ࢇ࢚	࢚ࢎࢋ	ࢊࢋࢉ࢏࢙࢏࢕࢔	ࢊࢇ࢚ࢋ =
														last	trust	value ∗ (1 + daily	rate)ୢୣୡ୧ୱ୧୭୬	ୢୟ୲ୣି୪ୟୱ୲	୲୰୳ୱ୲	୴ୟ୪୳ୣ	ୢୟ୲ୣ (1)
Accordingly the daily rate is computed as follows:
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3.2. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Then, similarly to Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), an event-study was conducted where the
acquisition is considered as an event. Thus, a period of 26 weeks is examined, where the
stocks are considered in event time and then the returns are analyzed after the
acquisition date. Therefore, to enable the analysis of the post-acquisition returns of
SPACs that consummated an acquisition for each week, the abnormal return, raw return
and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are computed.
The abnormal return (AR) is computed through the difference between actual
return of the share price of the SPAC and the return of the market index, which is
multiplied by the β parameter.  In a simple way, it corresponds to:
࡭ࡾ = ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	ݐℎ݁	ܵℎܽݎ݁	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ − ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	ݐℎ݁	ܫ݊݀݁ݔ ∗ ߚ (3)
The return on the share price and the return on the index are calculated,
accordingly, as follows:
ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔ = ݈݊(ܸ݂) − ݈݊(ܸ݅)                (4)
Vf – Final value of the share or the index, according to what we are calculating;
Vi – Initial value of the share or the index, according to what we are calculating.
In our calculations to compute the share price return and market index return, the
share price are the ones available in each week after the decision date of the SPAC and
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the market index parallels to each week after the decision date of the SPAC. The market
index used in our analysis is the Russell 1000, which are also the one used in Jenkinson
and Sousa (2011)7.
The beta parameters are used only after the acquisition because of the SPAC
structure, since there is no operating business at a previous stage and between the
announcement and the decision date the comparison of the share prices are not viable
due to the short period of time to compute the firm beta parameters. As such, we use the
beta  parameter  as  also  used  by  the  authors,  the  market  β =  1  and  Industry  β =  firm-
specific β. The industry beta used in our calculations are the ones available by Aswath
Damodaran, which were extracted by the Value Line database of 7,036 US companies
as of January 2010 (middle of the sample that we are comparing with the previous
results).
Additionally, when we are computing the raw returns it corresponds to the above
formula described for the abnormal return but considering that β equals to zero.
Afterwards,  the CAR of each acquiring firm is the sum of the abnormal return
performances since the first week until the last week of the analysis, which in our case
is the week 26:
࡯࡭ࡾ = 	 ∑ ܣ்ܴ௧ୀଵ                           (5)
3.3. SPACs Investment Strategies
In the line with Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) we estimated how much would be the
internal rate of return (IRR) earned by the investors that followed possible “SPAC
Investments Strategies” proposed by the authors.
The possible “SPAC Investment Strategies” are as follows:
1) Strategy I – “the investor creates a portfolio by investing the same amount in the
ordinary equity of all SPACs in our sample on the first trading day after the IPO
7 The Russell 1000 lists the 1000 largest U.S. public companies. Moreover, it represents 92% of the U.S.
stock market value.
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and then follows the strategy of (a) voting against and redeeming Bad SPACs
shares (we assume they would receive their money two months after the vote)
and  (b)  selling  their  stake  in  “Good”  SPACs  on  the  day  before  the  decision
date”;
2) Strategy II – “the investor buys each SPAC on the first trading date after the IPO
and sells one week after the announcement date”;
3) Strategy III – “the investor buys a unit (share plus warrants) at the IPO and then
follows  the  strategy  of  (a)  voting  against  and  redeeming  Bad  SPACs,  and  (b)
selling  their  equity  stakes  in  Good SPACs on  the  day  before  the  decision  date
and selling the warrants on the first day after the decision date if the acquisition
was approved”.
It  is  important  to  stress  that  for  each  of  the  strategy  the  individual  IRR  has  its
particularities,  as  such  further  details  of  the  IRR  computations  done  for  each  of  the
above strategy and the portfolio return calculations are described in the Appendix 2.
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All SPACs (123) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($m raised) 155.3 92.0 1035.0 11.9
% of IPO procceds in the trust 97.3% 98.8% 105.0% 79.7%
% owned by founders after the IPO 21.1% 20.0% 54.0% 10.5%
% of warrants issue over common stock 103.5% 97.2% 206.5% 49.3%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 510.2 546.0 953.0 28.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 162.5 125.0 573.0 3.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 97.2% 93.3% 433.1% 56.4%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 101.2% 94.6% 450.4% 70.8%
SPACs that made an acquisition (74) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 151.2 77.5 1035.0 11.9
% of IPO procceds in the trust 97.6% 99.0% 105.0% 83.2%
% of management after the IPO 21.5% 20.0% 54.0% 10.5%
% of warrants issue over common stock 103.5% 97.2% 206.5% 49.3%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 510.0 546.5 953.0 28.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 147.8 121.5 482.0 3.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 100.8% 93.0% 433.1% 56.4%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 106.2% 93.4% 450.4% 70.8%
SPACs that were liquidated (49) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 161.5 100.0 920.0 35.0
% of IPO procceds in the trust 96.8% 98.5% 104.0% 79.7%
% of management after the IPO 20.5% 20.0% 27.7% 15.2%
% of warrants issue over common stock 98.6% 92.3% 183.7% 76.8%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 510.6 538.0 697.0 128.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 184.7 133.0 573.0 35.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 90.4% 90.2% 99.5% 65.8%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 92.3% 91.3% 99.9% 79.2%
4. Results
This chapter main objective is to present the results obtained by using the methodology
above and compare our results with the ones obtained in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011),
considering the changes in the SPACs structure referred in the subchapter 2.2.
4.1. Comparison of Descriptive Statistics between 2003-2006 and 2007-
2013
In the Table 1 the descriptive statistics of the SPACs occurred between 2007 and 2013
are presented and then compared to the ones occurred between 2003 and 2006 (Table 2)
studied in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011).
Table 1 – All SPACs analysis 2007-2013
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It is important to note that during the period 2007-2013, some of the changes that
occurred in the SPACs “composition” were visible in our computations, such as the
offering units in the IPO and the time frame adopted for announcement and decision to
approve a deal.
Unlike to previous SPACs, which went public and sold units comprised of
shares of common stock and warrants in their IPO, some of the SPACs analyzed in the
period between 2007 and 2013 sold only shares of common stock, due to the fact that
they believe that the dilutive effects of the warrants found in the typical structure of
other  SPAC  IPO  was  not  present  in  their  case,  and  as  such  they  believed  that  this
SPACs will be viewed more favorably by potential target companies when determining
which company to engage in a business combination with. Examples of SPACs with
this composition are American Realty Capital Healthcare Trust, Inc. and Hyde Park
Acquisition Corp. II.
Table 2 – All SPACs analysis 2003-2006
All SPACs (58) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($m raised) 69.0 53.5 196.7 9.1
% of IPO procceds in the trust 91.3% 91.2% 100.0% 85.0%
% owned by founders after the IPO 19.1% 18.5% 35.0% 15.3%
% of warrants issue over common stock 143.2% 163.8% 210.1% 68.9%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 377.7 412.0 602.0 62.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 263.6 231.0 637.0 61.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value2 99.7% 97.8% 151.5% 91.9%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 107.3% 98.8% 224.3% 79.0%
SPACs that made an acquisition (43) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 65.3 51.5 196.7 9.1
% of IPO procceds in the trust 90.7% 90.1% 100.0% 85.0%
% of management after the IPO 19.1% 18.1% 35.0% 15.7%
% of warrants issue over common stock 144.5% 163.9% 210.1% 68.9%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 364.0 396.0 588.0 62.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 271.2 235.0 637.0 140.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 100.7% 98.1% 151.5% 92.6%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 110.7% 99.6% 224.3% 79.0%
SPACs that were liquidated (15) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 79.5 70.4 150.0 19.0
% of IPO procceds in the trust 93.1% 95.0% 100.0% 85.0%
% of management after the IPO 19.1% 19.2% 24.0% 15.3%
% of warrants issue over common stock 139.3% 160.6% 181.4% 81.1%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 419.6 429.5 602.0 148.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 240.1 210.5 511.0 61.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 96.2% 96.9% 99.2% 91.9%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 95.9% 96.3% 99.2% 90.7%
Source: “Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market”, Jenkinson and Sousa (2011)
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By comparing the averages of all SPAC sizes, in 2003-2006 and 2007-2013, we can
verify that in the second period the SPAC size were more than double when compared
to the first period ($155.30m vs. $69.01m). According to Lakicevic et al. (2013), this
huge difference between the both periods can be justified considering the fact that
between 2003 and 2006 SPACs were newly introduced to the capital markets, as so they
were not listed on the major markets.
The percentages of proceeds placed in the IPO are also important to compare.
The recent SPACs “overfund” the trust account by placing a higher amount in the trust
account instead of offering more of warrants as a unit. As we can see in the Table 1,
recently investors are placing 105% in the trust account, while in the first period of
analysis the maximum amount placed in the trust account were 100% (Table 2).  The
extra amount placed to “overfund” in the trust account, comes from an investment that
the sponsors make in the SPAC through a private placement that occurs simultaneously
with the IPO. For instance, this higher amount placed in the trust account and a lower
amount in warrants by investors makes sense, since it would allow investors to receive a
higher amount back in case they want to redeem their shares, i.e. in case they would not
like to proceed with the investment, they can redeem their shares and receive the return
on the investment made on the shares of the SPACs, which would be higher.
Moreover, by comparing the Table 1 with the Table 2, we can see that the
percentage of warrants issued over the common stock has changed from 143.2% in
2003-2008 to 103.5% in 2007-2013. The reason of having such decrease in the amount
of warrants issued over the common stock is due to the fact that some SPACs decided to
offer less warrants comparing to the common stocks or offer only common stock as a
unit, since investors can get a higher return in case they want to redeem their shares.
Additionally,  after  the  possibility  given  to  SPACs  to  not  announce  the
acquisition in the period of 18 months and adopt only the flat time of more or less than
24 months to take the decision, most of the SPACs have chosen to proceed in this way.
Hence, their announcement and decision to approve or reject a deal are in approximate
dates. As such the maximum period to announce an acquisition has increased over the
time reaching to the maximum of 953 days between the IPO and announcement date
while in the first period of examination (2003-2006) it has reached to 602 days, which
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means that during this period of analysis most of the companies were accomplishing the
given period of 18 months to announce an acquisition.
Consequently, we can also realize that, between 2003 and 2006 the average
number of days between announcement date and decision date (264 days) is higher than
in the second period (2007-2013).
The descriptive statistics regarding the SPACs that made an acquisition and
those that were liquidated are also important to compare.
As we can see in the Table 1, the situation stated by the authors Jenkinson and
Sousa (2011) in the Table 2 – SPACs that made an acquisition were smaller than those
that  were  liquidated  ($65m  vs.  $80m)  –  has,  in  one  way  or  another,  similar.  In  our
study, the size of the SPACs that were acquired ($151m) is also smaller than the SPACs
that were liquidated ($161m).
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) descriptive statistics analysis suggests that “deals
that convince investors are found sooner” than those that are liquidated. According to
the  Table  2,  the  time  took  to  made  the  announcement  of  an  acquisition  is  364  days
compared to 420 days to liquidate the business combination. However, the above
suggestion is not applicable for 2007-2013, since the SPACs that were acquired and
those that were liquidated have spent approximate days (Table 1).
4.2. Comparison of Descriptive Statistics between “Good” and “Bad”
SPACs
Besides the comparison of the SPACs that conducted an IPO in the both time-frames
(2007-2013 vs. 2003-2006), it is also important to compare the SPACs that proceeded
with a business combination in the both of the time-frames, i.e. comparison between the
“Good” and “Bad” SPACs.
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SPACs that made a GOOD acquisition (19) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 135.2 80.0 432.9 11.9
% of IPO procceds in the trust 97.9% 99.8% 100.4% 83.2%
% of management after the IPO 24.3% 21.0% 54.0% 16.5%
% of warrants issue over common stock 104.3% 103.4% 138.5% 56.0%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 518.3 574.0 679.0 192.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 118.3 68.0 408.0 3.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 134.6% 100.2% 433.1% 77.2%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 158.9% 111.4% 450.4% 100.4%
SPACs that made a BAD acquisition (55) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 156.7 75.0 1035.0 20.0
% of IPO procceds in the trust 97.6% 98.7% 105.0% 83.8%
% of management after the IPO 20.5% 20.0% 28.8% 10.5%
% of warrants issue over common stock 107.6% 99.1% 206.5% 49.3%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 507.1 544.0 953.0 28.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 157.9 125.0 482.0 14.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 89.7% 88.2% 105.1% 56.4%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 87.9% 87.0% 100.0% 70.8%
Table 3 – SPACs that proceeded with an acquisition (2007-2013)
The time taken by a “Good” SPAC to announce an acquisition (518 days) is
approximately the time that a “Bad” SPAC takes to announce an acquisition (507 days).
This conclusion is quite different with the obtained for the period 2003-2006 by
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) when the “Bad” acquisitions were announced later than
“Good” Acquisitions, as can be seen in Table 4.
Even though the occurred SPAC structure changes and the fact that most of the
SPACs adopted a flat time to take the decision to proceed with a business combination,
the investors are not taking advantage of having more to decide to proceed with the deal
or not.
Moreover, even considering the advice provided in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011),
i.e. investors should consider the share prices at the decision date, it seems that investors
are not considering it as a factor to acquire or liquidate the business combination. There
are still more “Bad” SPACs (55) than “Good” SPACs (19).
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Table 4 – SPACs that proceeded with an acquisition (2003-2006)
In 2003-2006, as presented in the Table 4, a SPAC was approved even when the
price was representing 79% of the trust. Nevertheless in 2007-2013 we have a more
surprising fact, as we can see in Table 3, a SPAC was agreed even when the price
represented 70.8% of the actual trust value.
 As we can see in the Table 4 (2003-2006), “For the portfolio of Good SPACs
(…)  the  premium  to  the  trust  value  drifts  steadily  upwards,  reaching  an  average  of
131% of the trust value at the decision date”. Taking into account our study, Table 3
(2007-2013), we can also confirm that the same response of the share price is achieved,
getting an average of 159% of the trust value at the decision date.
Similar  to  Jenkinson  and  Sousa  (2011)  with  the  intention  to  evaluate  if  the
responses of the share prices around the announcement and decision date are immediate
we have computed also the indices based on each date due the gap that exists between
the announcement and decision date. The following Figure 2 and Figure 3, shows the
contrast of the “Good” and “Bad” SPACs response to the share prices around the
announcement and decision dates, respectively.
Notwithstanding the above, it is important to note that, even with SPACs
structure change, namely in the period taken for the announcement and decision date,
there is always the obligation of the investors to announce the acquisition – investors
cannot decide to proceed with a business combination without announcing its intent –
SPACs that made a GOOD acquisition (20) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 65.6 36.2 196.7 9.1
% of IPO procceds in the trust 90.0% 88.4% 100.0% 85.0%
% of management after the IPO 19.2% 17.9% 35.0% 15.7%
% of warrants issue over common stock 148.5% 164.3% 190.6% 68.9%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 330.6 297.5 557.0 62.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 300.4 259.2 581.0 170.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 104.1% 99.4% 151.5% 94.4%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 130.6% 117.7% 224.3% 100.8%
SPACs that made a BAD acquisition (23) Average Median Maximum Minimum
SPAC size ($mln raised) 65.2 55.2 172.5 17.3
% of IPO procceds in the trust 91.3% 90.3% 100.0% 85.2%
% of management after the IPO 19.0% 18.7% 22.6% 16.6.%
% of warrants issue over common stock 141.0% 161.3% 210.1% 78.9%
Nº of days between IPO and annoucement date 393.0 456.0 588.0 94.0
Nº of days between annoucement date and decision date 245.9 227.0 637.0 140.0
Share price at announcement date / Actual trust value 97.7% 97.7% 105.0% 92.6%
Share price at day before decision date / Actual trust value 93.4% 96.1% 99.9% 79.0%
Source: “Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market”, Jenkinson and Sousa (2011)
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even if the days between the announcement and decision are very short, e.g. three days
(as the minimum reached in our study, Table 3).
Figure 2 – Response of the share prices around the announcement date
Figure 3 – Response of the share prices around the decision date
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As in the study of the authors Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), Equally-weighted price
indices are created also based on the share price three days before the announcement
date. The above figures, shows us that on average the share prices after the
announcement date for the “Bad” SPACs remains below the trust value, which drops in
the last few days before the decision date. The inverse is also visible for the “Good”
SPACs,  on  average  the  share  prices  of  “Good”  SPACs  remains  upper  than  the  trust
value  of  the  SPAC,  which  seems  to  drift  upward  before  the  decision  date.  As  so,
investors  are  provided  with  those  signals,  which  are  related  to  the  future  post-
acquisition returns, provided that market prices are informative.
Considering the fact that share prices remains similar after the announcement of
an acquisition it suggests that investors already knew the acquisition that would be
announced.
As such, since most of the acquisition deals were “Bad” SPACs instead of
“Good” SPACs, an event-study was conducted, as in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011),
which results are explained in the next section in order to let us know also if the market
prices at the decision date, in our sample, corresponds to the returns that the investors
can get post-acquisition, i.e. if market prices are also informative in 2007-2013.
4.3. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Table  5  shows  the  raw  returns  for  each  of  the  groups  of  “Good”  and  “Bad”
SPAC. It is clearly visible that, even not considering in the week 26 one of “Good” and
one of “Bad” SPAC due to the fact that the trading data of those SPACs that was not yet
available, “Bad” SPACs performance decrease after the decision date and “Good”
SPACs does not appear to perform so poorly as “Bad” SPACs.
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Weeks after
acquisition N Average se N Average Se Average se
4 19 -2.4% (0.151) 55 -34.1% (1.369) ** 31.6% -(0.327) *
13 19 -11.1% (0.478) 55 -42.6% (1.617) *** 31.4% -(0.647) *
26 18 -22.9% (1.125) 54 -63.7% (7.759) *** 40.8% (1.125) ***
Weeks after
acquisition N Average se N Average Se Average se
4 19 -2.9% (0.202) 55 -9.1% (0.520) ** 6.2% -(0.317) *
13 19 -9.3% (0.212) 55 -23.9% (0.608) *** 14.6% -(0.396) *
26 19 -18.7% (0.318) 54 -58.8% (1.178) *** 40.1% -(0.860) **
Weeks after
acquisition N Average se N Average se Average se
4 19 -1.9% (0.137) 55 -4.0% (0.228) ** 2.1% -(0.091) *
13 19 -3.1% (0.181) 55 -11.9% (0.278) *** 8.8% -(0.097) *
26 18 -5.0% (0.056) 54 -19.5% (0.653) *** 14.4% -(0.596) ***
*, **, *** correspond to the statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively (t-test).
Panel C. Cumulative abnormal returns (Industry beta)
C.3. Difference between Good
and Bad SPACs
C.1. Good SPACs C.2. Bad SPACs
Panel A. Cumulative returns
A.3. Difference between Good
and Bad SPACs
A.1. Good SPACs A.2. Bad SPACs
Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns (Beta = 1)
B.3. Difference between Good
and Bad SPACs
B.1. Good SPACs B.2. Bad SPACs
Table 5 – Cumulative Abnormal Returns (2007 – 2013)
The raw returns after six months (26 weeks) of decision date for the “Bad”
SPACs is -63.7% while for “Good” SPACs is just -22.9%. These results continue
decreasing after six months (Figure 4) by reaching a negative raw return of 111.5% for
the “Bad” SPACs and -53.5% for “Good” SPACs, after one year.
It is important to note that, as in the study previously examined by the authors
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), in the above results the cumulative abnormal returns for
“Bad” SPACs are statistically different from zero after the second week of the
acquisition.
Once again, it suggests that investors knew the announcement that would take
place, since it is already reflected in the share prices.
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Figure 4 – Raw Returns (2007 - 2013)
Additionally, as already mentioned, we have also compared the average
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) considering the single factor model CAPM. Thus,
according to our computations, CAR for “Good” and “Bad” SPACs are quite similar to
the raw returns (Table 5).
The results demonstrate that markets share price were still informative to
approve/reject the acquisitions as in Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) but so if investors
would have listened to the market, i.e. at the date of the decision to approve or reject the
deal they should considerate into their “decision arguments” the share price at that
moment, they would have avoided huge losses.
The negative raw return obtained in our sample was larger than in Jenkinson and
Sousa (2011). Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) obtained a negative raw return for “Bad”
SPACs after six weeks of 39%, while in our study we obtained a negative raw return of
63.7%.  By comparing  the  “Good”  SPACs raw returns,  we  can  see  that  in  both  of  the
periods (2003-2006 vs. 2007-2013), after 6 months of the acquisition the raw returns
also increased from 6.2% to 22.9%. The raw returns for the second period increased
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may be due to the fact that larger companies were issued as SPACs in larger capital
markets.
According to our results, we can also argue that even with the recent changes in
the  voting  policy  of  SPACs  investors  are  still  not  listing  to  the  market  in  order  to
liquidate “Bad” SPACs and avoid huge losses, as advised in Jenkinson and Sousa
(2011).
For a founder, proceed with a “Bad” SPAC, rather than liquidated is always a
better decision, since his payoff depends on a business combination, even if it is a good
or a bad deal. Sometimes, founders know exactly how to proceed with a business
combination, even if prior to the decision date the majority is not in favor of the same.
As we know to complete an acquisition, founders have to vote their founder shares
according to the majority voting of public shares. However, as already mentioned by
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), founders can have the public shares that are also taken into
account at the decision date. As such, founders can buy shares, which correspond to
votes just to proceed with the deal by voting in favor of the agreement. With this
possibility introduced for the SPAC founders, the change in the voting policy that
entered recently does not matter, due to the fact that investors can redeem their shares
and get their investment return back even if the votes are in favor of the proposed deal.
In order to confirm this behave we analyze the share turnover in the two months
prior to the decision date (Figure 5), which will allow us to measure the average
liquidity of the stocks just prior to its decision date.
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Figure 5 – Shares turnover for acquired SPACs (2007-2013)
According to the figure above, we can see that our results are consistent with
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), i.e. the share turnover increases in the last week of the
decision for the “Bad” SPACs that were approved while the turnover for “Good”
SPACs remains quite similar along the days. The increase in the share turnover in the
last days before the decision also means that the stocks are robust and in the last days it
is easier to find targets for our business combination. This fact corresponds to the reality
that we have stated above, if founders notice days before the supposed decision date that
the SPAC will be liquidated, they will buy public shares just before the decision date in
order to increase the turnover and allow to proceed with an acquisition, by voting in
favor of the business combination.
4.4. SPACs Investment Strategies
Similar  to  Jenkinson  and  Sousa  (2011)  we  also  estimated  the  IRR  of  possible
Investment  Strategies.  Strategy  I,  an  investor  spend  the  same  amount  in  the  ordinary
equity  of  all  SPACs on  the  first  trading  day  after  the  IPO and  then  votes  against  and
redeems “Bad” SPACs shares or sells  their  stake in “Good” SPACs on the day before
the decision date. Strategy II, an investor buys each SPAC on the first trading date after
the IPO and sells one week after the announcement date and finally, in Strategy III an
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Average Median Min Max St Dev Equallyweighted
Value
weighted
Strategy 1 13.0% 7.2% 2.6% 55.6% 12.7% 13.1% 13.3%
Strategy 2 21.6% 7.6% -5.6% 293.4% 46.8% 11.9% 11.2%
Strategy 3 13.2% -0.1% -7.2% 88.6% 26.2% 15.5% 15.5%
Source: "Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market?", Jenkinson and Sousa (2011)
Strategy
Individual IRR Portfolio IRR
Average Median Min Max St Dev Equallyweighted
Value
weighted
Strategy 1 11.1% 8.7% 0.0% 241.9% 22.4% 12.0% 11.1%
Strategy 2 3.9% 3.8% -40.2% 34.3% 8.0% 2.3% 2.3%
Strategy 3 8.5% 5.5% -2.4% 236.0% 23.1% 7.9% 7.7%
Strategy
Individual IRR Portfolio IRR
investor  buys  a  unit  (share  plus  warrants)  at  the  IPO and  then  follows  the  strategy  of
voting against and redeeming “Bad SPACs” or selling their equity stakes in “Good”
SPACs on the day before the decision date and selling the warrants on the first day after
the decision date if the acquisition was approved.
The results of these strategies are presented in Table 6 and confirm that markets
are informative, and thus investors can profit at low levels of risk as previously shown
by Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) for the period between 2003 and 2006 (Table 7).
Table 6 – Investment Strategies 2007-2013
 Table 7 – Investment Strategies 2003-2006
According to the results for the period between 2007 and 2013, presented in Table 6, it
is  possible  to  confirm  that  following  the  Strategy  I,  an  individual  SPAC  would  have
obtained an average return of 11.1%.
From the results obtained for each strategy for both periods (2003-2006 and
2007-2013) it is clear that the second strategy presents the higher difference between
both periods. As mentioned, the strategy II implies that an investor buys a SPAC on the
first trading date after the IPO and sells one week after the announcement date. This can
be justified by the fact that SPACs are no longer obligated to announce a business
combination within a defined period, i.e. 18 months. Recently SPACs are allowed to
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announce an acquisition and a week after, for example, acquire or merge with a
company. Considering that the SPAC price near the decision date of the deal produces
lower portfolio returns since the value created/destroyed of the deal is already reflected
in the SPAC at that time, in the second period of the analysis as the announcement date
is nearby the decision date,  the portfolio return is  lower than in the first  period of the
analysis.
Regarding the strategy III the returns are lower in the second period of analysis.
This difference is mainly justified due to the fact that lower amounts are invested in a
unit  of  SPACs,  and  also  some  SPACs  are  recently  composed  only  by  common  stock
instead of common stock and warrants.
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5. A real case: “Aldabra II acquires Boise”
Aldabra II Acquisition Corp. (hereafter Aldabra II), based on the industry of
paper packaging, consummated its IPO on June, 2007. Aldabra II received gross
proceeds of $ 414 million that were composed by 41.4 million units of securities at
$10.00 per unit. Each unit was composed by one share of common stock and one
warrant. The warrants were exercisable for one share of common stock at $ 7.50, as
previously referred warrants are normally “out of the money”. Considering the
prospectus available we were able to extract the first and the last trust amount placed in
the escrow, i.e. $ 400.010.092 and $ 403.989.000, respectively. By dividing the trust
amount by the number of units of the SPAC (41.4 millions of units, in our case) we got
the initial ($ 9.86) and the last trust value ($ 11.25) per share. It is important to stress,
that the last trust value, normally, does not correspond to the trust value at the decision
date, since the last prospectus available is issued days or months before the decision
date.
In order to get the trust value during the SPAC, and consequently at the decision
date, we estimate the trust value, by rolling forward the trust value using comparison of
the last trust value per share with the first trust value available.
On the first  day the share price of Aldabra II  was $ 9.15, while at  the decision
date the share price was $ 8.50.
Aldabra II announced its intent to acquire Boise Cascade, LLC on September,
2007 and on February, 2008 closed the deal. The new (merged) company was renamed
Boise, Inc. Figure 6 compares the share price with the trust value as from the IPO to the
decision date and it can be seen that even after the announcement of the acquisition the
share price remains below the trust value, which suggest that investor didn’t value the
deal as a value created deal. Nearby the decision date, the price goes down again,
suggesting investors were trying to sell their shares instead of voting against and get
their pro-rata shares of the trust account (which can take several months to happen). The
behave of the share price (specifically in the decision date) clearly suggest the investors
see this business combination as value destroying deal. The fact that the deal went
ahead clearly suggest the investors didn’t “listened” to the market.
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Weeks after
acquisition
Cumulative Returns Cumulative Returns (Beta=1) Cumulative Returns (Beta=industry)
4 -15.2% -13.1% -10.9%
13 -67.0% -69.5% -57.9%
26 -78.7% -74.9% -62.4%
52 -228.2% -177.8% -148.2%
Figure 6 – Aldabra II acquisition of Boise, Inc.
The CAR for the year that followed the acquisition was measured and the results
presented in Table 8.
Table 8 – CAR – Aldabra II Acquisition Corporation
As the share price at decision date suggested, the cumulative abnormal returns
clearly confirm the fact that this deal was indeed a value destroying operation, or in the
terminology of this dissertation a “Bad” SPAC. The Aldabra II acquisition of Boise,
Inc. shows us the (huge) negative returns obtained by the investors since the deal was
approved. After 6 months of the approval of the deal the cumulative return was -78.7%
which increase to an astonishing -228.2% after one year. The cumulative abnormal
returns are similar.
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“In the days after Boise, Inc. was created in 2008, its new CEO said the outlook
for the paper and packaging company was strong. A year later, the company’s stock was
trading at 24 cents a share, a 97 percent decline.”8 Further to this news, if in this case
investors had listened to the market they had avoided huge losses. Of course, there was
a period afterwards that the company (Boise, Inc.) has recovered its “bad” period,
however the investors that invested in the SPAC, maybe by trusting in the ability of the
founders, incurred to huge losses that could be avoided at the decision date just by
“listen” to the market.
8 http://magicvalley.com/business/how-boise-inc-came-back-from-the-brink/article_11f44260-1f1c-11e3-
b4e8-0019bb2963f4.html
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6. Conclusion
SPACs are considered as an alternative investment vehicle to access to the
public markets. Some investors use this alternative vehicle to access public markets
instead of private equity funds or a traditional IPO. In reality, SPACs are a very specific
type of an IPO but with some characteristics that make it more interesting for some
investors.
Our study focus in the relationship between the markets share prices and the
decision of the investors regarding the acceptance or rejection of an announced
acquisition. According to the previous studies investors are influenced by the decision
taken by the founders of the SPACs, which have a strong incentive to approve the
proposed deal even if a value destroying deal. Recent changes in the SPAC structure
made pertinent to update the study by Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) where the authors
advised that investors should “listen” to the market at the decision date. Hence, this
dissertation followed very close the methodology used by the authors. Although
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) recommended investors that they should listen to the
market, our study clearly show that investor are not following their advice and are
constantly approving “Bad” SPACs, which lead to huge negative returns in the year
after the acquisition is approved.
Recent changes in the SPACs structures also didn’t help the investors to take
better decisions. The change in the SPAC structure has altered the lifetime given to the
investors to announce or make a decision, in order to enable the investors to have more
time to make the right decision, as there were some of them stating that the short period
of 18 months was not enough to announce good deals since they were not provided with
enough time to evaluate the deal. Also, a new voting policy that introduced the
possibility of the investors to redeem their  shares even if  the votes are in favor of the
deal has not proved to be enough to prevent investors to approve value destroying deals.
 According to this study, neither the recent changes in SPAC structure nor the
warning provided by Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), that stated investors should consider
the market prices at the decision date before approve/reject the deal, prevented the
investors of constantly approving value destroying deals and obtaining large negative
returns in the year that followed the deal.
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8. Appendixes
Appendix 1: SPACs Timeline
SPAC IPO
Announcement of the acquisition
Founders search for a potential target
Decision Date: Acquire a
company?
YES NO
Incomplete
SPAC
YES NO
Liquidated
SPAC
Complete
SPAC
Become a normal public
company and shares are
distributed to investors
Merged
companies trade
normally
18
M
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s
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Appendix 2: Individual IRR measure for each strategy
In  order  to  compute  the  individual  IRR,  we  separate  each  SPAC  according  to  the
decisions of “redeem” or “sell” (this separation would be useful for the first and third
strategies referred above). “Redeem”, if the share price one day before of the decision
date is lower than the last trust value and “sell”, if otherwise. As such in each of the
strategy the individual IRR is calculated as follows:
· Strategy I - Buy at the 1st trading day and sell in the day before the decision date
(D-1) or redeem 60 days after the decision date (D+60):
 If the investor should “sell”:
ࡵࡾࡾ = ቀ ௦௛௔௥௘	௣௥௜௖௘	஽ିଵ
௧௥௨௦௧	ଵೞ೟௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚	ௗ௔௬
ቁ
యలఱ
೏ೠೝೌ೟೔೚೙
ିଵ
               (6)
Duration = day before the decision date – 1st trading date                (7)
If the investor should “redeem”:
ࡵࡾࡾ = ቀ ௟௔௦௧	௧௥௨௦௧		
௧௥௨௦௧	ଵೞ೟௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚	ௗ௔௬
ቁ
యలఱ
೏ೠೝೌ೟೔೚೙
ିଵ
                (8)
Duration = 60 days after the decision date – 1st trading date            (9)
· Strategy  II  –  Buy  at  the  1st  trading  day  and  selling  one  week  after  the
announcement (A+1w):
ࡵࡾࡾ = ቀ௦௛௔௥௘	௣௥௜௖௘	௔௧	஺ାଵ௪
௧௥௨௦௧	ଵೞ೟௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚	ௗ௔௬
ቁ
యలఱ
೏ೠೝೌ೟೔೚೙
ିଵ
             (10)
Duration = One week after the announcement date – 1st trading date            (11)
· Strategy  III  -  Buy  at  the  IPO  and  sell  the  equity  stakes  one  day  before  the
decision date (S D-1) or redeem 60 days after the decision date (D+60) and the
warrants one day after the decision date (W D+1):
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If the investor should “sell”:
ࡵࡾࡾ =
																							
ቆ
ቀ	௦௛௔௥௘	௣௥௜௖௘	஽ିଵା
ೢೌೝೝೌ೙೟ೞ
಺ುೀ	ೞ೓ೌೝ೐ೞ
ቁ
ூ௉ை	௦௛௔௥௘	௣௥௜௖௘
∗ ܯܽݔ	(ݏℎܽݎ݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	ܦ + 1 − ܧݔ݁ݎܿ݅ݏ݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	ݓܽݎݎܽ݊ݐ; 0)	ቇ యలఱ೏ೠೝೌ೟೔೚೙ିଵ (12)
If the investor should “redeem”:		
ࡵࡾࡾ = ௟௔௦௧	௧௥௨௦௧	
ூ௉ை
యలఱ
೏ೠೝೌ೟೔೚೙
ିଵ
																							(13)	
Duration = day before the decision date – IPO date              (14)
Afterwards, the IRR for the portfolios are computed. As referred previously, we
construct two different portfolios for each of the strategies described above. The equally
weighted  portfolio  main  idea  is  to  provide  the  same  weight  to  each  share  of  the
portfolio. Our portfolio is constructed with all of the SPACs issued between 2007 and
2013 (giving two years of decision time, i.e. until end of 2015 or start of 2016). The
construction of this portfolio for each of the mentioned strategies provides to investors,
which participate in more than one SPAC, a better perspective of the strategy that
should be followed, since it gives the same weight to the shares of small and large
SPACs. The value weighted portfolio is based on the value of the market capitalization
of  the  issued  SPAC.  This  type  of  portfolio  is  also  analyzed  for  each  of  the  strategies
providing the weight to each of the SPAC and considering their weight in the market, so
that smaller and larger components hold their value accordingly.
Further to the above, the equally weighted portfolio for the first strategy (Buy at
the 1st trading day and sell in the day before the decision date (D-1) or redeem 60 days
after the decision date (D+60)), is constructed by following the next steps:
1) We sort all the dates available, i.e. dates of the 1st trading day and the
date available one day before the decision or sixty days after the decision date, it
will depend if the investor should “redeem” or “sell” according to our previous
analysis for the individual IRR;
2) We define a value of the share price for the above sorted dates, i.e. we
define the amount of -1.00 USD as a value at the 1st trading day and the value of
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the share price at the day before the decision date or 60 days after the decision
date, which will correspond to the defined prices used in the approach to define
the individual IRR, divided by the share price at the first date. It is important to
note that, we define the value of -1.00 USD at the first trading date of the SPAC
considering that if the decision is taken at the same date of the IPO, the SPAC is
liquidated and investors and founders will get nothing.
3) After sorting the above dates considering the respective values for
those dates, we compute the actual value for each date, as follows:
࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒	ࢂࢇ࢒࢛ࢋ = 	௏௔௟௨௘	௔௧	௧௛௘	ௗ௘௙௜௡௘ௗ	ௗ௔௧௘(ଵା஽௔௜௟௬	ூோோ)(ೣష೤)		                         (15)
Where the,
X – Date for which we are computing the actual value;
Y – First date that we have computed
Daily IRR – is obtained by pre-defining that the sum of all the actual values should be
zero. Consequently we can also obtain Annual IRR = (1+Daily IRR)365 – 1
The computations in the second strategy have the same approach of the first one,
but in this strategy the value of the share price is defined for the 1st trading day, as in the
previous strategy, and for one week after the announcement date.
For  the  third  strategy  we  also  use  a  similar  approach  with  the  same
computations, however using different variables. Instead of 1st trading  day  we use  the
prices of the shares ate the IPO to compute the value of the same. Additionally, instead
of using only the share prices for the day before of the decision date or share prices for
60  days  after  the  decision  date,  which  will  depend  on  the  decision  to  take  by  the
investors, we use the share prices and also the warrants price.
The second type of portfolio, value weighted portfolio, is also computed for each
of the strategies, as referred above. Therefore, first of all, we sort all the dates that will
be included in each of the strategies (1st trading date, one day before decision date or
sixty days after the decision date, one week after the announcement date, IPO date).
Then we will define the value for the dates included in each of the strategy. In the first
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and second strategy, we are buying at the 1st trading  date;  as  such  we define  that  the
value of all shares at the 1st trading date for each SPAC will correspond to one percent
of the market capitalization of the SPAC (share price multiplied by the number of
shares at the 1st trading day). It is important to note that as in the previous portfolio we
also define a negative share price for the 1st trading day of the SPAC. Thus, in all of the
SPACs  the  1st trading date value will be one percent of the “negative” market
capitalization at that date. The value of the SPAC, depending on the decision to “sell” or
“redeem” for each strategy, is calculated by dividing the amount that the investor can
get at that date (one day before the decision/sixty days after the decision or one week
after the announcement, for the first and second strategy respectively) by the value
calculated previously for the 1st trading date, multiplied by the negative share price at
the first trading date. In the third strategy instead of defining the value of 1st trading day
we define the value for the IPO with the same approach. Additionally the value at the
decision is defined also with the same approach but includes also the warrants value,
which is defined as zero if the decision should be “redeem” the SPAC or if the decision
should be “sell”, as follows:
ࢃࢇ࢘࢘ࢇ࢔࢚	ࢂࢇ࢒࢛ࢋ = (ܵℎܽݎ݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	ܽݐ	D+1 −ݓܽݎݎܽ݊ݐ	݁ݔ݁ݎܿ݅ݏ݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁) ∗ ௡௢.௪௔௥௥௔௡௧௦
௡௢.௦௛௔௥௘௦	௔௧	ூ௉ை                (16)
After these calculations for the construction of the value weighted portfolio, we
compute the actual value for each of the SPAC as in the equally weighted portfolio and
then the Daily IRR and Annual IRR, as previously mentioned.
